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1 



Man and Nature at Port Hudson 
1868, 1917 



BY MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 
Professor of History, Louisiana State University 



Reprinted from The Military Historian and Econo- 
mist, Vol. II, No. 4, October, 1917, and 
Vol. Ill, No. 1, January, 1918 



COiPUiENK 




MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 
1863, 1917 

MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 



Two miles below the point where Thompson's Creek flows 
into the Mississippi River was the village of Port Hudson, at 
the extreme northwest corner of the Louisiana parish of East 
Baton Rouge. Twenty miles below is the parish seat and 
state capita], the city of Baton Rouge. Bayou Sara, a small 
village at the foot of a steep bluff on which is St. Francisville, 
is about eight miles north of Port Hudson; the mouth of the 
Red River is twenty miles farther on, with Vicksburg another 
110 miles upstream.^ From Port Hudson to Clinton, the seat 
of East Feliciana parish, ran the Clinton and Port Hudson 
Railway, twenty-one miles long. Clinton was the entrepot for 
the produce of much of southeastern Louisiana and Mississippi, 
which, sent thence by rail, was transferred to steamboats at 
Port Hudson. This railroad, built in 1833,^ was one of the 
first in the United States, and like all the early roads was 
a feeder for water traffic. Today, ten miles of the track, from 
Clinton to Ethel on the Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Rail- 
road, is still in use. The rails and crossties of the other part 
have long since been removed, though long stretches of the old 
road bed are still to be seen along the public highways. 

Port Hudson, at that time, was really a port. Situated 
on an abrupt almost precipitous bluff, just where the river 
makes a sharp turn to the west, it overl6oked a wide stretch of 
level alluvial plain on the opposite shore. At the foot of the 
bluff was a narrow beach, upon which already were growing 
willows, cottonwoods and other saplings. Along this beach the 



1 These are the direct distances by land. By river they are from a third to 
four-fifths greater. 

* Semple, American History and its Geographic Conditions, 37^. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

river was gradually making a "batture" or deposit of alluvion, 
submerged at high water, but gradually encroaching upon the 
stream, which in turn was steadily gnawing at the peninsula 
in the southwest crook of the bend. Just within the curve on 
the northeast side, right below the village, the river had de- 
posited a little sandy peninsula. Not far above this was the 
mouth of Foster's or Sandy Creek. In the narrow inlet 
between the peninsula and the bluff was the landing place for 
Port Hudson. Today, the bluff is perhaps a mile from the 
water's edge, and the low, level batture intervening is thickly 
grown with trees some of them thirty or forty feet high and as 
many years old. Anyone wishing to go to Port Hudson by 
water must land at Port Hickey a mile below. The traveller 
by rail will get off at a village called Port Hudson, on the line 
of the Louisiana Railway and Navigation Company. Thence, 
proceeding on foot or by vehicle, for a mile or so to the west, 
he will come to an almost deserted cluster of houses now known 
as ''old Port Hudson."=* 

The bluff upon which Port Hudson is situated is several 
miles long, varying in height from sixty to eighty feet above the 
water. ^ A generally level plateau extends eastward for a mile 



^ See the map on the next page. This was adapted by Miss Lizzie Marion- 

neaux, (a student of Louisiana State University) from Plate XXXVIII of the 

Atlas of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies [cited below as 

O. R.,] and a few touches were added by me. 

Explanation: 

p. f Dotted line, shore in 1863. 

\Solid hne; shore in 1917. 

_ , , , f Light lines: Confederate. 
Entrenchments i ^^ ,. ' ^ . 

(^ Heavy imes, Union. 

A careful personal examination of the topography about Port Hudson, and 
a comparison of state, parish and historical maps makes me think that the map 
in Spears' Farragid (p. 282) is inaccurate in its proportions, and that in Davis' 
Rise and Fall of the Confederate Governmefit, II, 42, (cited below as R. & F. C. G.) 
is not much better. The map in Battles and Leaders (cited below as B. & L.) 
is drawn from Plate XXXVIII, which seems the best, with Map XIII in Liver- 
more's continuation of Ropes' Story of the Civil War, (II) as a good second. 

* The Confederate Military History (cited below as C. M. H.), X, 109, gives 85 
feet as the extreme height; Federal naval officers estimated it at 75 and 80 feet. 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, (cited below as O. R. N.), 
Series 1, vol. XIX 35'} ,354. 






MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 




MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

or more, sloping rather sharply inland to Sandy Creek, which 
flows through difficult marshes and dense canebrakes. Mr. 
F. L. Richardson, writing in the New Orleans Times-Democrat 
(April 25, 1906),^ states that in 1863 "the country immediately 
around and adjacent to Port Hudson was broken. There were 
no high hills, but ravines and hollows which ran from the river 
were frequent, and in some places forty to sixty feet below the 
common level." This is true today; some of these are mere 
rain-washed gullies, others are canyon-like gulches, sloping 
steeply to the river, and following an irregular course. One 
of the most important is the channel of the nameless, sluggish, 
insignificant little "bayou", which merges just south of the 
hamlet of Port Hickey. 

Mention has been made of Thompson's Creek. This stream 
rises in Wilkinson county, Mississippi, flowing south then south- 
west. It forms the boundary between the parishes of East and 
West Feliciana, Louisiana, and as has been said, enters the 
Mississippi two miles above Port Hudson, bringing with it 
sand and gravel. Too shallow for navigation by anything but 
canoes and flatbottomed barges in high water, the mouth of 
the creek afforded a hiding place for light draught Confederate 
vessels as will appear later. 

Port Hudson's strategic value depended in part on its being 
the terminus of the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad. Roads 
ran northward to Clinton, Jackson and Bayou Sara, and thence 
into Mississippi, southward to Ross and Springfield Landings 
and Baton Rouge; eastward to the Comite and Amite rivers. 
General Banks thought its great importance arose from the 
facility with which the Confederates could concentrate troops 
at this point. ^ The possession of Port Hudson also gave them 
control of the mouth of the Red River, as well as of the Miss- 
issippi at a point between New Orleans and Vicksburg. 

They perceived these facts, so "about the first of April, 1862, 
earthworks were thrown up; a mere wall with a dry ditch, from 



^ This article was called to my attention by Mr. A. H. Jelks, postmaster at Port 
Hudson, to whom I am indebted for other favors in connection with the prep- 
aration of this paper. 

• 0. R., XV, 255. 



MILLEDGE L, BONHAM, JR. 

which the earth had been cast to make a wall about four and 
a half feet high, and not over five or six feet broad at the top; 
the base from eight to fifteen feet thick. This was built with 
angles." Starting from the river near Sandy Creek, the line 
"ran back for a quarter of a mile, and thence forming a section 
of a circle, it extended southward for about three-quarters of 
a mile and then turned back toward the river, which it reached 
about a mile and a quarter below the place of starting."' Shortly 
after this, New Orleans fell, and in May Baton Rouge was 
occupied by the Federals. But so long as the Red River and 
its tributary the Ouachita, were open to the Confederates, 
supplies and troops could be brought from the trans-Missis- 
sippi states, and they had a "secure line of communication 
through Texas and Mexico with Gulf ports. "^ 

A Mr. Pond, of Clinton, clearly indicated the importance of 
Port Hudson, in a letter he wrote (Sept. 2, 1862) to Adjutant- 
General Cooper. "This position," said he, "is of the first 
magnitude and importance and should be held at any cost. 
It gives us command of a section of the river from here to 
Vicksburg; guards the country watered by the Little, Red, 
Black and Ouachita rivers in Louisiana, provides a safe means 
of transit for supplies and munitions of war, and gives communi- 
cation with an immense producing area in the west. Texas 
is brought into communication with all the interests of the 
nation, and her abundant products can and will find their way 
to our army depots. The western side of the river is our only 
reliance for sugar, and already thousands of hogsheads are 
collected on the other bank, under the range of our guns, 
awaiting transportation. Western Louisiana produces immense 
quantities of salt, and all that is needed is the means of transit 
to fill the demand for both public and private uses." He also 
pointed out that while practically impregnable from the river, 
Port Hudson was "approachable over a large and level country, 
presenting very few difficulties to a land attack .... an 
advancing force would encounter but few natural impediments."^ 



^ Richardson. 

8 Semple, 305; Fiske, Miss. Val. in the Ciml War., 183 sq. 

9 0. R. XV, 808. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

After the indecisive battle of Baton Rouge (Aug. 5, 1862), 
Major General Breckinridge assigned Brigadier- General Daniel 
Ruggles to the command of Port Hudson and the troops in the 
vicinity. He was directed to continue as rapidly as possible the 
fortification of the post. Taylor promised to send any siege guns 
he could spare, to help in this.'" While Ruggles was busy at 
his task, the U. S. Gunboat Essex slipped up the river. Pass- 
ing down later, she was injured by the three guns then mounted, 
though not destroyed, as Ruggles thought." We shall hear 
from her again. 

Towards the end of August, Major-General Van Dorn, 
commanding at Vicksburg, directed Ruggles to bring most of 
his men to Jackson, Miss., leaving from 2,400 to 2,800 at Port 
Hudson, under Brigadier- General W. N. R. Beall. Lieuten- 
ant-General Pemberton, then commanding at Jackson, ordered 
Beall, about the 22d of October, to intrench at once, by detached 
redoubts and redans, the approaches to Port Hudson by most 
of the roads leading into the village, leaving open the Jackson 
and Clinton roads. '^ Beall had trouble in carrying out these 
orders, as he could not persuade the planters to supply the 
slaves for intrenching, and the War Department declined 
his suggestion that martial law be declared, though he was 
authorized to impress slaves.'^ Two months later he was 
superseded by Major-General Franklin Gardner. 

This officer was a West Pointer, "a native of New York and 
at [this] time was forty years old. He had seen service in the 
Mexican War and on the frontier. He had spent much of his 
time in Louisiana, and had married a daughter of Governor 
Alexandre Mouton of that state:'* It was said of him, "a 
thoroughly earnest man, he was untiring in his efforts to pre- 
pare for the conflict which had become inevitable after New 
Orleans had been captured and Vicksburg menaced."'^ 



^UUd., 800 sqq. 
" Ihid., 803, 808. 
^Ihid., 841. 
^Ubid., 841, sq. 
1^ Richardson. 
16 C. M. H., X, 109. 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

How the post appeared about this time, is shown by the 
diary of a Baton Rouge girl, who thus describes what she saw, 
proceeding south from the village: ''Following a crescent, far 
below us lay the water battery, concealed by trees which grew 
by the water's edge, looking from where we stood like quite 
a formidable precipice. Then .... through a camp, 
down a steep hill, past a long line of rifle pits, a winding road 
and another camp, where more men stared and cooked their 
supper, we came to the last battery but one, which lay so far 
below that it was too late to visit it."^*' 

Gardner found that a large amount of work had been done, 
generally well done, but there was still much to do. Though 
he considered the batteries well made and well posted, there 
was not enough ammunition. As to the field works, he found 
them well laid out and constructed, and being pushed as 
rapidly as the limited resources would permit, hence he urged 
that entrenching tools be sent at once. In his opinion, the 
broken country made it difilicult to fortify every point thor- 
oughly, without extending his lines too far.'' Early in Janu- 
ary, 1863, anticipating an attack from the Federal forces in 
Baton Rouge, he asked Pembertbn and General Jos. E. Johns- 
ton for additional forces. The latter was reluctant to send 
any more, and thought Gardner could hold the place against 
any attack with what he had, i.e., about 10,500 of whom he 
reported 8,239 effective.'^ These he organized into three 
brigades of infantry, with artillery and cavalry as separate 
commands. Later his force was increased to five brigades of 
infantry, which with the other two arms aggregated 26,720. 
Gregg's brigade held the right of the line, Maxey's the centre 
and Beall's the left.'« 

Colonel Fauntleroy, inspector-general of Johnston's army 
made a visit to the post this month (January) and found a 
"lack of discipline and instruction among the troops, with a 



1* Dawson, A. Confederate Giro's Diary, 247. This book gives several personal 
glimpses of the officers of the garrison. 
"O.R.,XV,9l3sq. 
'Ibid., 921, 933. 
'" Ibid., 934, 1032, 1061. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

very general inefficiency of the officers of the command." 
The batteries on the bluff extended over a mile, and he con- 
sidered them "very formidable," but he did not think the 
water battery, of two 32-pounders, so well placed. The 
magazines he thought badly located, as did Gardner. Fauntle- 
roy found Gardner "much embarrassed by the presence of a 
nmnber of women and children .... remaining in spite 
of his recommendation to remove .... persons who 
have come to occupy the houses made vacant by the owner's 
removal. 2° Gardner was never entirely relieved of this 
embarrassment. 7- 

Ten days after this inspection Gardner notified Pemberton 
that Banks had arrived at Baton Rouge with reinforcements. 
To this Pemberton sent the encouraging reply — "Enemy 
endeavoring to get below Vicksburg." He directed Gardner 
to send up the Red River all steamers, between Port Hudson 
and Vicksburg, destroying any in danger of capture. ^^ 
Throughout February, Gardner remained in doubt as to 
Banks' movements, and as to whether the force at Baton 
Rouge was to be increased or withdrawn. On the 22nd 
Pemberton announced that he would send a brigade to rein- 
force Port Hudson, adding comfortingly, "Mortar boats can 
do you no possible harm. Remember to reserve your ammu- 
nition, for I have no more to send." The same day, Gardner 
replied: "Rations are essential now."^^ Except for sending 
out a few skirmishing expeditions on both sides of the river 
he seems to have devoted all his time and resources to strength- 
ening his works. Rust's brigade arrived to reinforce him, on 
the 3rd of March, and soon after some other troops, of which 
he made a brigade under Buford.^^ 

Meanwhile Banks had returned to New Orleans, and sent 
an expedition under Weitzel, which "was trying to find a 
way of turning Port Hudson on the west by means of the 
Atchafalaya, the mouth of the Red River and the network 



20 0. R., XV, 943 sqq. 
" Ibid. 955 sqq. 
^ Ibid. 985. 
^Ubid. 991-1005. 



MJONVEBS'N Wi 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

of bayous interlacing and intersecting one another, that connect 
the Atchafalaya with the Mississippi."^^ The way was ob- 
structed by General Dick Taylor, who skilfully and stubbornly 
contested the advance from Berwick, towards Alexandria. 
At Farragut's suggestion Banks agreed to make a combined 
land and water attack on Port Hudson. This was due to 
the admiral's desire to try to get his fleet past the batteries 
at Port Hudson, which desire was increased by the news that 
two rams, the Indianola and the Queen of the West, which had 
run by Vicksburg had been captured by the Confederates.^^ 

Accordingly Banks concentrated his forces at Baton Rouge, 
and moved to the rear of Port Hudson on the 14th of March. 
As late as November 1862, the Confederates had made no 
provision for a force upon the west side of the river, though 
the Essex found and destroyed a torpedo which they had 
placed in the river. In March a small infantry force was 
placed on the shore opposite Port Hudson, which was later 
occupied by the Federals who placed four cannon there,2<5 as 
shown on the map. Farragut had advanced from Baton 
Rouge on the morning of the 14th of March to the head of 
Prophet's Island" where he found the Essex and some mortar 
boats. His plan was for the Hartford, (his flagship) to lead, 
with the gunboat Albatross lashed to her port side; the Rich- 
mond and the gunboat Genessee to come next; the Monongahela 
and the gunboat Kineo third, while the Mississippi, his fast- 
est ship, followed without a gunboat. ^^ Telling his captains 
that "the best protection against the enemy's Are is a well- 
directed fire from our guns,"^^ Farragut ordered the attack 
for dawn of the 15th; but finding his ships in readiness about 



2^ B. &- L., Ill, 589; cf. Banks' report, 0. R., XXVI, 5-18. 

2^5 The Indianola was so damaged that she had to be destroyed to prevent 
her recapture; the Queen was destroyed in an engagement on the Teche in April. 
Scharf, History of the Confederate Navy, 362 sq. 

28 0. R. N.',\, XIX, 351, 543, 679, 681. 

"This island is sometimes called "Profit Island," or ''ProiStt's Island," but 
as the legend is that it was the abode of an Indian medicine man, Prophet's 
seems preferable. 

28 Farragut's report, 0. R. N., 1, XIX, 665, and diagram, 669. 

29 Spears' Farragut, 281-291, gives an interesting account of the action. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

Mr. Nesbit, however, says that until the point was occupied 
by Federal troops Taylor had occasionally succeeded in swim- 
ming cattle across, and also sent in corn and potatoes. The 
fleet prevented the escape of the steamers Starlight and Red 
Chief from the mouth of Thompson's Creek, where the Con- 
federates had concealed them, so they fell into the hands of 
the Federal troops. ^^ 

Returning now to Port Hudson, we find that Banks retired 
to Baton Rouge on the 15th of March, and ten days later 
moved via Brashear and Franklin to the Teche country. 
This compelled Taylor to withdraw towards Opelousas, with 
skirmishes at Bisland and Vermilion Bayou en route. Opelou- 
sas was occupied by the Federals on the 20th of April, Taylor 
retiring to Alexandria on the Red River. Having gotten in 
touch with Farragut at the mouth of the river, Banks started 
for Alexandria on the 5th of May, pushing Taylor slowly 
towards Shreveport.^'-' One effect of the approach of the 
Union forces was the closing of the "Louisiana State Seminary 
of Learning and Military Academy" (near Alexandria) of 
v/hicli William Tecumseh Sherman had been the first 
president.*" 

What was Gardner doing while Farragut was patrolling the 
Mississippi and Banks advancing up the Atchafalaya and Red 
rivers? In April, Pemberton v/ithdrew the brigades of Rust 
and Buford; and ordered Gregg's to Jackson, Miss., on the 
1st of May. Next day Gardner asked for more cavalry and 
"a good commander." This was met by the order to turn 
over his command to Beall and bring 5,000 infantry and all 
his cavalry to Vicksburg. Maxey's brigade and Miles' Legion 
were also ordered from Port Hudson a few days later. When 
Gardner got to Osyka, Miss., he received (May 8) the following 
from Pemberton: "Return with 2000 troops to Port Hudson 
and hold it to the last. President says both places must be 



38 0. i?. iV., 1, XX, 46, 202, 211. 

39 0. R., XV, 294-315; XXVI, i, 10 sq. B. b- L. Ill, 590 sqq. 

^^ Fleming, Gen. Sherman as a College President, passim. The Seminary is now 
Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge. 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

held."^' On this point Davis remarks: "I had regarded it 
of vast importance to hold the two positions at Port Hudson 
and Vicksburg. Though gunboats had passed the batteries of 
both, they found it hazardous and transport vessels could 
not prudently risk it."*^ 

{To he continued) 

MiLLEDGE L. BONHAM, Jr. 

« 0. R., XV, 1069, sgq. 1080. 
^R.b-F. C. G., II, 422. 



Reprinted from The Military Historian and Economist, Vol. Ill, No. 1 
January, 1918 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 
1863, 1917 

MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 
II 

After going up the Red River about sixty miles beyond 
Alexandria, Banks wrote to Halleck, on the 12th of May 1863 
that it was impossible to join Grant at Vicksburg, as he had 
not the means of transportation, and dared not abandon his 
stores, trains, etc., to the enemy. Likewise, he did not con- 
sider it "practicable to follow the retreating enemy to Shreve- 
port," so he said. "Nothing is left me but to direct my forces 
against Port Hudson with what success I may have.''^ Pursu- 
ant to this determination he crossed the Atchafalaya at Sims- 
port, and the Mississippi at Bayou Sara, on the 23rd of May, 
arriving before Port Hudson next day. He had ordered 
Major-General Augur to move from Baton Rouge with about 
3500 men. About four miles east of Port Hudson Augur's 
advanced cavalry encountered Colonel Miles, (May 24) who 
with 400 infantry and a battery had been sent on a recon- 
naissance by Gardner. At first Miles drove the Federals 
back, but when he encountered their main body was com- 
pelled to withdraw.'- Next day Augur formed a junction with 
Banks' forces and the siege of Port Hudson was begun. 

General Joseph E. Johnston, revising the old adage, con- 
sidered an army in (his) bush (or field) worth two in the 
enemy's hands; so on the 19th of May he had ordered Gardner 
to evacuate Port Hudson. To his dismay he received on the 
23rd a dispatch of the 21st saying that Banks was crossing at 
Bayou Sara, forces were coming from Baton Rouge, so Gard- 
ner demanded reinforcements. Johnston responded by re- 
peating his orders for evacuation, adding, "You cannot be 
reinforced. Do not allow yourself to be invested. At every 

'O.R.,X\', 316 sq. 

Ubid., l,XXIV,i, 12,667, sq. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

risk, save the troops, and if practicable move in this direction." 
But it was too late: Gardner never received the message.* 
Even if it had reached him in time, it is doubtful if he would 
have disregarded Pemberton's emphatic: "The President says 
both places must be held." 

It is not the purpose of this essay to follow the siege in 
detail. Neither the data nor the technical knowledge is at 
the writer's command. Were they available, it is to be 
doubted if such an analysis would be of profit, in the light of 
twentieth century military science. Only the larger move- 
ments, then, will be sketched, and certain lesser incidents, 
interesting in themselves, will be recounted. 

The Confederate works have been partly described above, 
and the map opposite page 375 will show their main features. 
Mr. Richardson, in the article quoted, affirms that these lines 
were designed for defence by 22,000 troops at least, and one 
can well believe it. Less than 6000, of whom not over 4500 
were effective, held the place on the 24th of May.^ Commenc- 
ing near Sandy Creek, these lines followed roughly the outer 
edge of the plateau, which in some places, e.g., the northeast, 
sloped rather abruptly; but, for the most part, merged grad- 
ually into the plain. The appearance of the lines was somewhat 
that of a semi-ellipse, whose right end rested on the river in 
the ravine or bottom, just below Port Hickey. On the hill 
just above was the strong redoubt known as "the Citadel."* 
Opposite, on the crest of the slope across the bayou, the Fed- 
eral left later rested. Thence the Union lines wound in a very 
irregular and discontinuous way back of the present Mt. 
Zion church (negro), across the public road, now leading to 
the National Cemetery, northeast to the ravine again and so 
on behind the site of the present village of Port Hudson to 
the morass and canebrakes in the Sandy Creek bottom. The 
map in Spears' Farragut (p. 282) has "impassable abatis" 
marked outside the Confederate works. This phrase is justi- 



» Ibid., 242. 

^ Livermore says 4600; Richardson, 4200: Banks says Gardner surrendered 
5500 in July. 

^ This is clearly shown on Map XIII, Livermore, op. cit., II. 



MILLED GE L. BONHAM, JR. 

fied by Mr. Richardson, who says: "In most of the ravines 
small undergrowth abounded. On the outside of the fort, 
however, the trees and undergrowth had been cut down all 
around the entire fortification so as to give an unobstructed 
view of any force which might assail it. On the Southern or 
lower wing, the trees had been cut down or thrown with their 
branches extended outward." The map shows this to have 
been true on the northern slope also, and we shall see that 
it was equally true of the centre. 

As described by Colonel Fauntleroy, in the report already 
cited, the works consisted of "a cremaillere line, connected by 
redans and curtains, extending over a distance of two and a 
half miles, the most important part of which [had] already 
been completed." Another line, extending for six miles had 
been commenced and Gardner was connecting the uncom- 
pleted portions on the north by rifle pits. The map drawn by 
General Banks' engineers during the siege® shows that begin- 
ning with the rifle pits near Sandy Creek, the defences had been- 
continued by the cremaillere, supplemented by other pits, for 
a mile to the southeast, where a more advanced cremaillere 
began, which continued, as shown on the accompanying map. 
southward, then irregularly southwest to the river near Ross 
Landing, below Fort Hickey. Outside this line were occa- 
sional redans, with curtains. Along the entire line were 
thirty or thirty-one guns, varying from 3-inch rifles to 34- 
pounders. Sometimes these guns were placed on barbettes; 
in other cases they were fired through embrasures; often one 
gun served two embrasures.^ At the more important angles, 
as that near the Plains Store road, as many as three guns were 
placed together. Some of the guns had to to be recast sev- 
eral times during the siege. Along the river bank were sev- 
eral strong batteries of two and three guns, with single guns 
at varying intervals. Their calibre was in general greater 
than that of those on the land side. Two were 32-pounders; 
two 42-pounders; two 68-pounders— about twenty guns in all. 
Photographs of some of the earthworks, part of a river battery, 

6 Plate XXXVIII, Atlas, 0. R. A. 

'' See map cited in Note 1. This is confirmed by Mr. Nesbit. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

rifle pits, the bastion fort or ''Citadel," and so on, may be 
seen in the Photographic History of the Civil War.^ 

Within the Confederate lines were several redoubts. Al- 
most due north of the village, between the river and the outer 
trenches was a pentagonal mound of earth, with breastworks 
upon it. Farther east was a lunette. South of the railroad 
were two parallel bastions, with rifle pits between the outer 
bastion and the cremaillere; at the southwest, was the Citadel 
with a similar line of rifle pits. The cremaillere itself was 
strengthened at intervals with redoubts.^ As seen above, 
there were about 5000 men with fifty pieces of ordnance to 
defend these works. Of course after the fort was invested 
Gardner got no reinforcements, while he was constantly losing 
by disease, desertion and battle. He reported 4098 present, 
the 30th of June.io 

Across the river, as noted, the Confederates had sharp- 
shooters and infantry, at the time of Farragut's dash, but this 
point was later occupied by the Federals who placed two 12- 
pound Napoleons near the upper end of the inlet back of the 
batture and two 30-pound Parrotts at different points farther 
down. 

At the beginning of the siege Banks had about 14,000 men, 
and according to Colonel Irwin, "from first to last had nearly 

20,000 men of all arms Yet the effective strength 

of infantry and artillery at no time exceeded 13,000, and at 
last hardly reached 9000.""^^ This was partly due, of course to 
climate and weather, which bore hardly upon the soldiers 
from the northern states. From the maps already cited, we 
learn that on the east side of the river the Federals had six 
30-pound Parrotts; five 24-pounders; fifteen 20-pounders; two 

*VIII, 210-217. Note also the pictures of Banks' artillery en route to Pt. 
Hudson, and the batteries for Vicksburg leaving the barracks at Baton Rouge — 
now the dormitories of Louisiana State University. Many of these pictures were 
taken by A. D. Lytle of Baton Rouge, who died only a few weeks before this 
article was begun. 

^ These details are shown more fully in the diagrams in Davis'e Rise and Fall, 
II, 421, and Spears' Farragut, 282, than in the other maps cited. 

10 0. 22. ^., I, XXVI, ii, 98. 

" B. b- L., Ill, 595. 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

lO-pounders; two 12-inch and six 8-inch siege howitzers, three 
10-inch and nine 8-inch siege mortars; four 6-inch, nine 3-inch 
and two 12-pound rifles; thirty- two 12-pound Napoleons; six 
6-pound Sawyers; two 9-inch Dahlgrens and three 24-pound 
guns. After the 9th of June there was added a naval battery 
of 9-inch Dahlgrens, under Lieutenant Terry of the Richmond}'^ 
Added to these land batteries were the guns of the fleet both 
above and below the peninsula, with its four guns.^^ 

The Confederates, after the first few days, reserved their 
cannon fire to repel assaults, as they had not enough ammuni- 
tion to waste on regular bombardments of the Federal posi- 
tions. An enormous mass of metal was thrown by the Union 
guns, day and night, into the Confederate works, but with 
relatively little damage. Richardson puts the total loss at 
176 killed and 440 wounded; 200 died from sickness; Gardner's 
chief surgeon reported 176 killed and 447 wounded; Irwin 
estimates the losses at 500 by desertion and capture, 700 
killed and wounded." An amusing phase of the bombard- 
ment was Banks' note to Captain Alden, at the time command- 
ing the fleet, requesting " that the mortar firing from the fleet 
be stopped, as the shells are bursting in the rear of our bat- 
tery."^^ Evidently he did not concur in Pemberton's opinion 
that "mortar boats can do you no possible harm." 

On the very day of the junction of the Federal forces (May 
24), occurred the first serious clash between the two armies. 
The forces of Weitzel, Grover and Dwight attacked the pickets 
and advanced forces of Gardner, and "after a sharp fight" 
drove them to the "outer line of entrenchments."^^ The 
Union forces were at this time distributed from north to south 
as follows: on the right, Weitzel commanded the divisions of 
himself, Dwight and Paine, besides two regiments of native 



12 0. R. N., 1, XX, 218; 0. R. A., I, XXVI, i, 141. A picture of this battery is 
shown in the Photographic History, which gives a good idea of the timber of this 
region. 

"0. R. N., 1, XX, 212, sq., 217. 

^iO.R.A., 1,XXVI, i, 144. 

16 0. R., 1, XX. 244. 

« Banks' report, 0. R. A., 1, XXVI, i, 13. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

negro troops-/^ Grover came next; then Augur held the centre 
and T. W. Sherman commanded the left wing. Gardner's 
left was held by the forces of Steedman and Shelby, com- 
manded by Colonel I. G. Steedman; Lyles held the lines where 
they crossed the railroad; General W. N. R. Beall had charge 
of the centre, and Colonel W. R. Miles, of Miles' Legion com- 
manded the right wing. Colonel M. J. Smith (formerly an 
officer of the United States navy) was in general charge of the 
heavy artillery, with Lieut-Col. P. F. de Gourney command- 
ing the ordnance of the left wing. 

Spending May 25th and 26th in careful preparation, Banks 
launched a general assault on the 27th. Augur and Sherman 
were to open at daylight, and at the first chance to carry the 
works in their respective fronts; whereupon Weitzel was to 
do likewise, Grover holding himself in reserve to reinforce the 
troops to either his right or left, as need might be. Banks 
closed his order for the attack with the statement: "Port 
Hudson must be taken tomorrow."^* 

But it was not. 

As we have seen, the Confederates had relied on the ravines, 
with their steep banks, the magnolia groves and dense thickets 
on the left, and had erected only detached trenches and rifle 
pits. During the night of the 26th, rail and log breastworks 
were hastily added. 

Weitzel started at 5 A.M., and by noon drove the Confeder- 
ates within their parapets. Grover's men clambered up a 
steep bank, about thirty yards from the trenches, but could 
not hold this, nor did their efforts farther to their left succeed. 
Next Dwight sent in his colored troops who were driven back 
with a loss of 103 killed and wounded, out of 700. Soon both 
Weitzel's and Grover's men ceased their efforts. Nothing was 
heard from the left. Banks had been waiting with Augur 
for Sherman's musketry as a signal. Augur had a level plain 
in front of him, with a clear view of the Confederate works, 



"These and other negro troops were later combined to form the "Corps 
d'Afrique." O.R.A.,l, XXVI, 539. 

1*0. R. A., 1, XXVI, i, 509. See also Livermore's brief but excellent account 
of this assault, op. cit., II, 332 sqq. 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

but the plain was obstructed by "a tangled abatis of huge 
trees," and back of this was nearly a mile of Confederate 
artillery and infantry. It had then, been intended that 
Augur's movements should serve merely to distract attention 
from Sherman's assault in force. Noon had come, and the 
cessation of firing on the right revealed a total silence upon the 
left. What was the trouble? "As the morning wore away," 
remarks Irwin, "and no sound came from Sherman, General 
Banks rode to the left and gave fresh orders for the assault; 
then returning to the centre, about two o'clock he ordered 
Augur to attack simultaneously."'^^ Livermore quotes from 
Irwin's History of the Nineteenth Corps to the effect that 
"about noon. Banks greatly agitated by the check on his right 
and still more by the silence on his left, rode down to Sher- 
man's headquarters. 'Hot words passed, the nature of which 
has not been recorded.' "-" We may guess at their tempera- 
ture, however, in the light of Banks' note to Weitzel, dated 
1:45 P.M. — "General Sherman has failed utterly and crimi- 
nally to bring his men into the field. At 12 M. I found him 
at dinner, his staff officers all with their horses unsaddled and 
none knowing where to find their commands. "^^ 

Under the sting of his superior's rebuke, Sherman now 
attacked with his brigades in column of regiments. Chmbing 
fences and pushing through abatis caused him to lose so 
heavily that his men had " to seek shelter." Chapin's brigade, 
on Augur's left, advanced as far as the abatis, which it could 
not pass. Dudley's brigade, on the right, was to follow, but 
Banks properly stopped it when he heard of the failure of 
Sherman's attack. The Federal loss was about 2000 killed 
and wounded; that of their opponents about 350. Sherman 
was badly wounded, losing a leg. Instead of taking Port 
Hudson, as he told his troops he must. Banks had the morti- 
fication of writing Grant that the Confederate works were 
"what would be called 'impregnable.' They are surrounded 
by ravines, woods, valleys and bayous of the most intricate 

" B. cr L. Ill, 504. 
20 0^ c/7., II, 335. 
^^O.R.A., 1, XXVI, i, 509. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

and labyrinthine character, that make the works themselves 
almost impassable. It requires time even to understand the 
geography of the position. "^^ 

Next day he requested a truce, to permit the gathering of 
his dead and wounded. In granting it Gardner requested 
Banks to give orders that his skirmishers should not advance 
towards the Confederate breastworks. "I am compelled," 
he said, "to make this request or condition, because your 
entire line moved somewhat forward yesterday afternoon 
under white flags displayed." Accepting the condition, 
Banks replied: "I have ascertained that a white flag was in 
fact improperly used on my right yesterday. It was dis- 
played by an inexperienced officer, without the knowledge of 
his commanders, and the flag which you displayed in acknowl- 
edgment gave them the first information of its existence. I 
need hardly say that I regret the circumstance exceedingly, 
as I have taken great pains to enforce the observance of the 
usages of war, in regard to such flags, within my command."^' 
Truly a refreshing contrast to the charge, denial and counter- 
charge of firing upon white flag and Red Cross, 1914-1917. 

Settling down to regular siege operations, the Union army 
and fleet kept up an almost continuous bombardment, night 
and day. Both Gardner and Banks had their difficulties, 
increased by the unsoldierly conduct of some of their own 
men. Members of certain regiments in the Confederate 
forces were so dilatory in obeying orders as to imperil the 
success of the defence. Distributing them amongst better 
troops was tried, to the great disgust of the commanders of 
the latter, some of whose men were sent to replace the lag- 
gards. Others refused to remove from left to right, saying that 
they had fortified the first position themselves. This sort 
of thing appears to have continued all through June. At 
first Colonel Steedman, in whose wing it was worst, tried 
"conciliation." By the 30th of June, however, he had decided 
that a soldier from one of these regiments (all from the same 
state) must "be shot by court martial before they are convinced 

^ Ibid., 1, XXIV, iii, 353. 

"0. R. A., 1, XXVI, i, 513-515. 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

that they have to obey orders irrespective of their own feeUngs." 
He considered these regiments "under no discipKne," because 
of their dislike of their officers. A week later he put the com- 
mander of one of them under arrest.^"* It was too late then 
(July 7). 

The trouble in the Federal lines was that troops whose term 
of enlistment had expired wished to leave at once. Many of 
them, Banks reported to Halleck, "openly say they [do] not 

consider themselves bound to any perilous service 

The troops near the end of their enlistment say they do not 
feel like desperate service; the men enlisted for the war do 
not like to lead when the rest will not follow." To this feel- 
ing he attributed the length of the siege and the inability of 
his troops to retain the occasional footholds they gained.^* 

After nearly two weeks of steady work at entrenching, com- 
bined with a continuous bombardment, Banks made another 
attempt to take the fort. A heavy artillery fire was kept up all 
of the day and night of the 10th of June. At three o'clock on the 
morning of the 11th, an effort was made to get within striking 
distance of the earthworks before daylight. Part of the troops 
making this essay worked clear through the abatis, only to be 
discovered and repulsed by the Confederates, who took several 
prisoners. One detachment, so Steedman reported, actually 
penetrated the lines and sheltered themselves from the rain, 
in a slaughter-house. On discover}^, they were speedily driven 
back into the abatis, whence they were dislodged by two com- 
panies of the 39th Mississippi. At daylight, another com- 
pany of Federals was revealed about 100 yards from the first 
of the Confederate siege guns. Grape and canister, in a 
double charge caused them to throw down their arms and 
scamper back to their own lines.^® 

Daylight, of the 14th of June, was the hour set for the second 
general assault. Dwight, on the left, was to cross the ravine and 
try to force an entrance into the works on the Confederate right, 
while Grover and Weitzel were delivering the main attack on 



"^Ibid., 146 5g., 158-163. 

26 Ibid., 563 sqq., 613. 

2»0. R. A., 1, XXVI, i, 14, 157 sqq. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

the Federal right. Augur, as before, was to feint in front of 
the centre. First, however, Banks issued (June 13) the follow- 
ing grandiloquent effusion: 

"Respect for the usages of war and a desire to avoid unneces- 
sary sacrifice of life, impose on me the necessity of formally 
demanding the surrender of the garrison of Port Hudson. 
I am not unconscious, in making this demand, that the garri- 
son is capable of continuing a vigorous and gallant defence. 
The events that have transpired during the pending invest- 
ment exhibit in the commander and garrison a spirit of con- 
stancy and courage, that, in a different cause, would be uni- 
versally regarded as heroism. But I know the extremities to 
which they are reduced. I have many deserters and prisoners 
of war. I have captured couriers of the garrison and have in 
my possession the secret dispatches of the commander. I 
have at my command a train of artillery seldom equalled 
in extent and efficiency, which no ordinary fortress can suc- 
cessfully resist, and an infantry force of greatly superior num- 
bers and most determined purpose, that cannot fail to place 
Port Hudson in my possession at my will. To push the con- 
test to extremities, however, may place the protection of life 
beyond the control of the commanders of the respective forces. 
I desire to avoid unnecessary slaughter, and I therefore de- 
mand the surrender of the garrison, subject to such conditions 
only as are imposed by the usages of civilized warfare.^^" 

This dispatch justifies Dmitry's characterization of Banks 
as "a general of great hopes and many fears." Of this sum- 
mons, he says: "In lieu of sternness [Banks] posed as a Ches- 
terfield-Talleyrand. As a Chesterfield, in his courtesy, he 
compliments the endurance of the garrison, while as a Talley- 
rand, in his diplomacy, he craftily suggests that his army out- 
numbers Gardner's force eight to one. On his side, Gardner, 
not finding that special form of surrender nominated in Johns- 
ston's bond, declined altogether to consider the demand. "^^ 
His declination was as brief as Banks' summons was verbose: 
"My duty requires me to defend the position, and therefore 

" Rid., 552, sq. 
^^C.M.H.,X., 117. 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

I decline to surrender. "^^ Farragut had expressed to Banks 
the opinion that though the Confederate soldiers might be 
willing to surrender, it would be utterly useless to ask Gardner 
to do so.'° 

Neither Augur's nor Grover's columns succeeded in effect- 
ing an entrance, but the Federal lines were in several places 
advanced to within 50 to 200 yards of the Confederate works. 
Brigadier- General Paine was severely wounded, leading an 
attack upon the Priest Cap, near the railroad. Dwight's 
guides misdirected him, so his attack, as a whole, came to 
naught, though on his extreme left, his troops got control of 
an eminence which commanded the bluff on which was the 
Citadel. Later, this enabled them to construct a trench with- 
in ten yards of the Confederate lines. In consequence of the 
loss of nearly 4000 troops, Banks felt that his "force was 
unequal to the task of carrying the works by assault." Where- 
fore, siege operations were pushed more vigorously, by bom- 
bardment, paralleling and sapping. ^^ 

Concerning the part played by the negro troops in this 
day's fight, Richardson gives some interesting items. His 
account is corroborated in its main details by the Confederate 
Sharpshooter already quoted. The fierce bombardment on 
the 13th, with Banks' demand for surrender, had of course 
apprised Gardner of the impending attack. Somehow, he 
learned that the negro troops on his extreme left would assault 
in force. To meet this, 1500 men were moved from his right,^^ 
and put under the command of Col. W. R. Miles. Each 
soldier had three muskets, already loaded. Every second man 
was ordered, after the first volley, to confine his activities to 
reloading the guns of his "Number 1." Miles ordered these 
men to "shoot low, boys, for it takes two men to carry away 
a wounded man, and they [the bearers] never come back." 
The fire was reserved until the enemy was within less than 



^W.R.A., 1, XXVI, i, 553. 
^W.R.A., 1,XXVI, i, 553. 
^Ubid., 14; S. &• L., Ill, 595. 

^2 Probably thereby enabling Dwight's men to gain the eminence mentioned 
above. 



MAN AND NATUE,E AT PORT HUDSON 

100 yards. "Fifteen hundred guns," says Richardson, 
"belched forth with almost a single sound, which was preceded 
by an ounce slug, which introduced terror and dire confusion 
into the brains and legs of the ignorant blacks." A second 
volley was sufhcient. The negroes fled, leaving nearly a 
thousand of their men upon the field. " There upon the ground 
where they fell, they were permitted to lie for the next three 
days, when the stench arising from their putrid bodies caused 
General Gardner to send out a flag of truce, asking that the 
Federal commander bury his dead."^^ It was arranged that 
the Federals should supply the teams and wagons, and the 
Confederates haul and deliver the bodies for burial. 

A pleasanter phase of the same day's fight is shown by the 
following correspondence between the opposing commanders. 
Wrote Banks: "I have the honor to request your permission 
to send a small quantity of medical and hospital supplies 
within your works for the comfort of my wounded in your 
hands, and of stick of your own as you may desire to use them 
fory^^ Gardner replied: "I will send out to meet any party 
you may wish to send with such medicines and hospital sup- 
plies as you may desire to send for your wounded in my 
possession. I take the liberty to inform you (deeming that 
you are probably ignorant of the fact) that there are a few of 
your dead and wounded in the vicinity of my breastworks, 
and I have attempted to give succor to your wounded, but 
your sharpshooters have prevented it."^^ 

One more quotation from Mr. Richardson's account may be 
of interest. It appears that at 7 :30 A.M., on the 14th of June, 



'^ Richardson's article purports to be based upon the memoirs of Col. de 
Gourney, commanding the artillery on this front. No such book is found in the 
Library of Congress, or the catalogues of books in print. The incident seems 
decidedly out of keeping with Banks' humane conduct on other occasions, and 
no confirmation of this statement is found in the Official Records. However, Mr. 
Nesbit tells me (July 4, 1917) that he distinctly recalls the stench of those rot- 
ting corpses, and Miles' injunction to reserve the fire until they could count the 
buttons on the enemies' coats. 

^ ItaUcs mine. 

'^ Both dispatches in 0. R. A., 1, XXVI, i, 557. For a similar request and 
reply, July 3-5, see same, pages 613 and 617. 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

those in the centre trenches saw "a dense mass [of Federals] mov- 
ing towards them in perfect order. In the front ranks there 
were two or three regiments of New York Zouaves, easily distin- 
guished by their red dress. . . . After getting within a 
thousand yards, our light guns, six and twelve pounders, 
opened fire, but did not stop their movement. . . . The 
brave soldiers attacking were so well drilled that it militated 
against their success. Having received the command to keep 
'closed up,' which is done by side-stepping to the right when 
a man falls out, in doing so after getting within a hundred 
yards [sic] they were forced to stop and there, for twenty or 
thirty minutes [seconds?] was presented a novel sight: regi- 
ment after regiment side-stepping, presenting a wavering line, 
undulating backward and forward without making any prog- 
ress or getting nearer their goal." After half an hour of shot 
and shell and musket ball, "it looked as though a wall of dead 
and wounded was piled in line, resembling a low breastworks." 
At the command to fall back, "they did so with so much con- 
fusion that the charge ended in a woful defeat." Making all 
due allowance for exaggeration and inaccuracy, this incident 
and the slaughter of the negroes indicate that Irwin's estimate 
of the Federal loss at nearly 4000 is not a high one. 

Despite these disasters, Banks favored concentrating his 
artillery upon the Confederate right and making another 
assault. From this he was dissuaded by Captain J. C. Palfrey, 
then acting as chief engineer. The latter proposed, instead, 
to approach the strongest point of the Confederate works 
(the Priest Cap) by covered trenches and parallels and a sap.^* 
This was undertaken before both the Priest Cap and the 
Citadel. As the hoyaux^'^ got near enough, the Confederates 
tossed hand grenades into them. 

Colonel Provence, of the 16th Arkansas, holding the line 
across the Plains Store road, discovered on the morning of the 
27th of June some earthworks 200 yards in his front and about 

^^ Livermore, op. cit., II, 400 sqq. 

" It was an interesting coincidence that a boyau was being made in the ravine 
of a bayou, which word is apparently a Louisiana-French corruption of the former. 

See New English Dictionary. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

300 yards in advance of the enemy's lines. The reports of 
two different scouts whom he sent to reconnoitre, made it 
clear that these works would render it impossible to post 
pickets outside the Confederate lines. Calling for volunteers, 
the colonel selected thirty of those responding, and sent them 
under Lieutenant A. S. McKennan to destroy this trench. 
Leaving their own works after dark, the sally party accom- 
plished their task, and captured seven men and thirty muskets, 
besides all the sandbags they could transport. ^^ 

This did not stop the Federal mining operations, though, 
any more than the fall of their saproUer into the ditch did. 
By the 1st of July a parallel some 300 yards long was completed 
in Grover's front, not more than fifty yards from the Confed- 
erate's advanced parapet. "We had burrowed into the hard 
clay of the bluff," says Private J. K. Hosmer, "driving the 
sap against the obstinate rampart. "^^ Mines were being laid 
under the Priest Cap and the Citadel, in which it was intended 
to explode thirty barrels of powder. Discovering these sap- 
ping operations on this same day, Gardner directed his chief 
of ordnance. Captain L. J. Girard, to construct a countermine, 
which was exploded on the 4th of July."^" Three days later. 
General Beall thought the Federal works were strong enough 
to enable them to throw a force into the Confederate lines, 
unless the regiment (1st Mississippi) holding the threatened 
Priest Cap should be strongly reinforced.^^ This was not 
done, however, as the fort surrendered the next day. 

We have seen that a large part of Gardner's supplies con- 
sisted of corn. From this meal was made, which was the 
principal ration of his troops. The fire of the Union guns put 
his grist mill out of commission; but not for long. Farragut 
wrote (June 18) to Captain Alden of the Richmond: "The 
enemy within Port Hudson has re-established his grist mill 
in the depot, by means of a locomotive, and I have directed 



38 0. R. A., 1, XXVI, i, 149, sqq. 

^^ Short History of the Mississippi Valley, 196. 

"0. i?. J., 1,XXVI, i, 14, 146. 

« Ibid., 148. 



MILLEDGE L, BONHAM, JR. 

Commander Caldwell to throw his shell at it when he fires. "^^ 
The working of this unique mill is shown and explained in 
the Photographic History of the Civil War. Lifted from the 
rails, the locomotive had a belt attached to its driving-wheels, 
and thus turned its traction-power into grinding power to 
provide the Confederates with cornbread. Even with this in- 
genious device, they suffered from hunger. Commodore Palmer 
wrote on the 1st of July that the garrison was said to be eating 
mule meat. The journal of the Richmond for the 7th of July, 
states that two deserters confirmed this report."** A lady of 
Baton Rouge, who had two brothers in Gardner's army, affirms 
that one of them said that as for mule meat, he had reached 
the point where "roasted rat tasted fine." Mr. Nesbit concurs 
in this epicurean dictum, adding that towards the last they 
were glad to eat any sort of animal they could catch. 

Winston Churchill, in his splendid novel. The Crisis^ has 
young Colfax slip out of Vicksburg, and float down the river 
on a log, to carry dispatches and secure percussion caps. 
Though Colfax was a figment of his author's brain, his ex- 
ploit was real. At the moment of this writing. Major Robert 
L. Pruyn, who performed such a feat lies ill at his home in 
Baton Rouge. Born, like Gardner, in New York, he had 
enlisted as a drummer at the age of ten (1844). After serving 
with Taylor's army in Mexico, he returned with Taylor to 
the post at Baton Rouge — now part of the grounds and build- 
ings of Louisiana State University. When he was discharged 
in 1849, he went back to New York, and followed the car- 
penter's trade. But the spell of the sunny South v*ras too 
strong, so he returned to Baton Rouge in 1853. On Louisi- 
ana's secession, Pruyn enlisted in the Delta Rifles, Company 
A, 4th Louisiana Infantry. After Shiloh he was made captain 
of Company B, and served at Vicksburg until July 1862, and 
took part in the battle of Baton Rouge, after which he was 
sent to Port Hudson. Gardner had been adjutant of Pruyn's 
regiment (the 7th U. S. Infantry) in the Mexican War, and 
knowing Pruyn well, selected him for torpedo service. After 

^'^O.R.N., 1, XX, 236. 
« Ibid., 250, 254, 803. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

several couriers had been killed or captured, attempting to 
slip through Banks' lines with dispatches, Pruyn decided to 
try his fortunes with Farragut. Hanging empty canteens 
about him as life preservers, he slipped into the water, on the 
night of the 10th of June, 1863. In floating down through the 
fleet, he scraped against a vessel, and alarmed the lookout. 
Narrowly escaping death or capture, he landed v/ell below the 
Federal camp and made his difficult and dangerous way to 
Jackson, Mississippi, where he delivered to Johnston a dis- 
patch which said: "I have repulsed the enemy in several 
attacks, but am still closely invested. I am getting short of 
provisions and ammunition of all kinds, and should be speedily 
reinforced." Johnston's reply, with which Pruyn started 
back on the 17 th of June, was as follows: "Your dispatch of the 
10th received. I have not the means of relieving you and your 
brave garrison. Vicksburg fully occupies me. General 
Taylor will do what he can on the opposite side of the river. 
Hold out as long as you can and then, if possible, withdraw 
in my direction, or cut your way out. It is very important 
to keep Banks and his forces fully occupied. I regret that I 
can send you nothing more encouraging." The imaginary 
Colfax floated down the river on a log; the real Pruyn, with 
this dispatch in a bottle about his neck, floated in a horse 
trough, made his way through the Federal pickets opposite 
Port Hudson, swam the river in the face of Confederate mus- 
ketry, and delivered his reply to Gardner. He escaped from 
the fort, just before the surrender, and served in the Atlanta 
campaign, as a major of cavalry, which position he held at 
the end of the war. Since then he has lived in Baton Rouge, 
pursuing the calling of a builder.^" 

Halleck telegraphed Grant on the 7th of July that "the con- 
dition of General Banks' army renders it important that you 
send him aid if it be possible. "^^ Possible or not, it was useless. 
The day before, Federal troops in the advanced lines explained 
to the wondering Confederates that the salutes and cheering 

** C. M. H., X., 554 sqq. Conversation with J. R. Nesbit, who accompanied 
Pruyn to the water's edge on June 10. 
*'O.R.A., 1, XXVI, i, 62. 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

which SO amazed them were due to the fall of Vicksburg. 
Gardner sent a flag of truce to ask Banks for an official con- 
firmation of this report, and received a copy of Grant's tele- 
gram. Next Gardner asked for an armistice to discuss terms 
of surrender. This being refused, he agreed to surrender at 
discretion. The actual transfer took place on the 8th of July, 
when, according to Banks, 5500 prisoners, 20 pieces of heavy 
artillery, 31 pieces of field artillery, five batteries and consider- 
able ammunition fell into his hands. The Confederates were 
rationed from the Federal commissary, and most of them 
paroled.*® 

The Mississippi was again open from the falls of St. An- 
thony to the Gulf.*^ 

Today, "old Port Hudson" is a cluster of small houses and 
cabins, many of them vacant, some ruinous. Nature and man 
have combined their forces to isolate the village. On the west 
the river has deposited a batture so that the "port" is about a 
mile from the water. The tall trees upon the batture even 
cut oft" the very sight of the river. Should the villager wish 
to gaze upon its waters, he must go to Port Hickey, a mile to 
the south. To the east of the old Clinton and Port Hudson 
railroad, man has torn up the part between the old village and 
Ethel. The other ten miles, from Ethel to Clinton, is now 
part of the Illinois Central system. Man has also run another 
railroad, more or less parallel to the river, and its station, 
a mile to the east of the old village, has usurped the name of 
Port Hudson, and a village has grown up about it. 

Of the Federal earthworks, scarcely a trace remains, and to 
find that one must scramble down ravines, creep through 
barbed wire fences and force his way through canebrakes. 
Three days after the surrender Banks ordered the demolition 

^^O.R.A., 1, XXVI, i, 52 sqq. 

*^ It may be noted that the arrivals of vessels from up the river at New Orleans 
shows clearl}^ the effects of the war. From September 1, 1861, to August 31, 
1862, during most of which both Vicksburg and New Orleans were open, 1456 
arrived; September 1, 1862 to August 31, 1863, while New Orleans was in Federal 
hands, and the Confederates controlled the river to Vicksburg, the arrivals dropped 
to 655; between September 1, 1863, and August 31, 1864, they rose again to 1414. 
Bonham, British Consuls in the Confederacy, 207. 



MAN AND NATURE AT PORT HUDSON 

of the works he had so painfully and laboriously constructed/* 
He knew better than anyone else the natural strength of the 
place, and wisely determined that should he be besieged 
in his turn, the Confederates must construct their own 
approaches. 

Time and weather have done much to accomplish the same 
for the Confederate works, and in this man has aided some- 
what. Grass grown sections still remain, and a few may even 
be seen by the casual traveller from the car window. The 
angles are frequently clearly defined, and here and there a 
barbette is perceptible. In many places roads have been cut 
through or run across the trenches, and the rains have helped 
widen the cuttings. Elsewhere the forest has grown up about 
and upon the breastworks. Trees twelve to thirty inches in 
diameter and (so a professor of botany says) some of them 
thirty to forty years old, may be seen growing upon the old 
works. Barbed wire fences straggle along or across others, 
but for a more peaceful purpose than those now to be seen in 
Flanders. At Port Hudson they are mainly to keep the low- 
ing herd from winding o'er the lea. 

Some years ago, Mr. A. H. Jelks, the postmaster at "new" 
Port Hudson decided to build a barn whose front should be 
upon the road, the rear opening into the barnyard. At the 
most suitable point for it, was a section of the entrenchments. 
Should he leave it, his barn would have to straddle the mound, 
which would emerge from each door; so he leveled it. Today, 
the space that was in 1863 occupied by mule-eating soldiers, 
is the home of forage-eating mules. 

Just across the highway from this barn is a large fragment 
of the same embankment, running roughly north and south. 
To the east has grown a fine live oak tree, perhaps twenty 
years old. To the west is the residence and shop of an Italian- 
American. From this shop was flying on the 16th of June, 1917, 
the only United States flag visible in Port Hudson — and that 
was on the Confederates side of the trench! 

The city engineer of Baton Rouge relates that some years 
ago, while making a survey at Port Hudson, he found, in the 

*^O.R.A., 1, XXVI, i, 633. 



MILLEDGE L. BONHAM, JR. 

angle of an old trench, the remains of a stack of arms. All the 
woodwork was of course gone, and the barrels and bayonets 
merely a mass of rust, but so gradual had been the decay, as 
the stocks mouldered away, that the barrels gradually descend- 
ed to earth, still retaining their position. At the first touch, 
though, the stack crumbled to pieces. 

Fields of cotton and grain grow today where Banks' men 
charged. Pigs and chickens and calves root and scratch and 
browse where the Confederates dug and starved and fought. 
The only war-like suggestion to be found in this peaceful 
hamlet was the suspicion, aroused by his kodak, that the 
writer was a German spy! 

MiLLEDGE L. BONHAM, Jr. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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